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A Summary of Mirjan R. Damagka's
Evidence Law Adrift
by
GORDON VAN KESSEL*

Inquiring into the foundations supporting common law rules of
evidence, Professor Dama~ka points to three aspects of the AngloAmerican institutional environment-the bifurcated trial court, the
temporal concentration of proceedings, and the adversary system of
adjudicatory fact-finding. He contends that these three "supporting
pillars" constitute "a protective scaffolding" for the common law evidence rules "that began to crystallize in the late eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries.' 1'
The bifurcated trial court, in which responsibilities are divided
between judge and jury, facilitates and makes effective the enforcement of common law exclusionary rules. In Continental systems with
unitary trial courts, strict enforcement of hearsay and other exclusionary rules is less practicable since the same individuals decide both
admissibility and weight. Dama~ka believes that the jury by itself
does not require technical evidence law, but a space for such rules
opens up when the trial court is split into law and professional parts,
and the more these two parts draw apart, the more favorable the climate for common law rules which exclude evidence or structure its
analysis.
The temporal concentration of proceedings in which fact-finding
is compressed into one-shot trials increases the need for rules which
focus issues and avoid surprise. There is greater need to control the
decision-makers' database in compressed proceedings because of the
danger of information overload, as well as a greater need to avoid unfair surprise in light of lack of ability to continuously check foundational factors. In contrast, when hearsay is considered in Continental
countries with informal episodic proceedings, there is enough time to
seek out the declarant when available or to collect information regarding the declarant's credibility when unavailable. As a result of
methodical and exhaustive preliminary investigations and subterranean influence of the case file, genuine surprise at trial is rare. Concentrated proceedings do not provide such opportunities. This
problem, together with the inscrutability of jury verdicts and the
minimal possibility of reconsidering factual issues on appeal, in*
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creases hearsay dangers and renders a presumptive ban on hearsay "a
good prophylactic measure to counteract the defects of derivative informational sources."2
The adversary system in which the parties and their attorneys
control evidence gathering and presentation, with the adjudicator
remaining essentially passive, leads to polarization of means of proof
and increased importance of testing evidence produced by the parties. Damagka contrasts Continental systems where pretrial evidence
collection is primarily the job of the judge or another official. Although counsel for the parties are not prohibited from conducting investigations, their contact with prospective witnesses is disfavored.
Preparing witnesses is strongly disapproved and may in some countries come dangerously close to tampering with evidence. For these
reasons, lawyers conduct few factual inquiries on their own, and
largely limit themselves to conveying leads to the official in charge of
proof-taking. If the court accepts counsel's proof initiative, the
means of proof becomes identified with the tribunal. Expert witnesses are appointed by the court and are viewed as assistants or aids
to the judge. Thus, in Continental countries the lack of partisan
preparation and presentation leads to viewing the inability of the opposing party to challenge evidence as less troubling.
But the more the means of proof is associated with the litigants,
the greater the perceived danger of distorted or false evidence and
the greater the need to provide the opposing party with means of
challenge. The anxiety about potentially misleading information
reaches its highest point in Anglo-American procedure where the
ready identification of witnesses with parties renders derivative
sources more problematic and "offers some support to the hearsay
curse even in the context of juryless trials."3
The three pillars operate synergistically and together provide a
"firm basis"4 for Anglo-American fact-finding style and the common
law of evidence. Erode any pillar and the rationale for the hearsay
rule is seriously weakened. However, erosion has been "the central
tendency of the twentieth century," 5 and, if advanced much further,
could threaten the stability of the entire edifice.
With the increased use of bench trials and other alternative
forms of dispute resolution, the jury trial now is "more ornamental
than functional."6 Due to expansive discovery procedures and exten2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 65.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 129.
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sive pre-trial proceedings, procedural compression has seriously deteriorated to the point of having been largely abandoned. While party
control seems to have escaped unscathed, it too has been reduced
through greater judicial involvement in fact-finding. Also, the sphere
of lawsuits which involve only autonomous parties has diminished.
"With jury trials marginalized, procedural concentration abandoned,
and the adversary system somewhat weakened,"7 common law doctrines of evidence often appear "deprived of a convincing theoretical
basis." 8 For the future, Professor Dama~ka sees "the creeping scientization of factual inquiry"9 as further straining the three foundations

and predicts that "common law evidence as we now know it is likely
to be confined to a narrower sphere, perhaps serious criminal cases,
or even completely discarded."1 However, he cautions against
looking to Continental systems for solutions, and predicts that the
"cracking pillars of common law evidence.. .will most likely be repaired-or replaced-by domestic masons and by indigenous building material."'"
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